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393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) that an employee
going and coming from work is outside
the scope of his employment. However,
the District Court of Appeal of Florida
looked to Sweat v. Allen, 200 So. 348, 350
(Fla. 1941) in stating that the "applicability of the rule depends upon the circumstance of the particular employment." The
court agreed with the commissioner's decision and found that Polite was not "offduty away from the employer's premises."
Id. Further, the court stated that "compensability is almost always awarded when the
injury occurs while the employee is traveling along a public road between two portionsof the employer's premises", citing
Larson on Worker's Compensation Law
§ 15-14(a) (1985). The court's essential
reasoning for finding an exception to the
going and coming rule was grounded in
the fact that Ms. Polite's duties required
her to be in two different locations within
the Dade County school system, and the
travel between the two different workplaces "was an essential part of her employment.'~ Id.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida
examined this case in two steps. First, an
examination of the compensability of the
injury found that the encouragement of
participating in after school activities,
coupled with the official permission and
knowledge of such participation by the
Dade County School System was substantial and competent evidence that the injury
arose out of and in the course of Polite's
employment. Second, the findings that
Polite was not "off-duty" at the time of the
accident, and that she was traveling the
only road available allowed the court to accept the Larson premises exception to the
"going and coming rule." The importance
of this Florida court's opinion is its recognition of the premises exception which
is present and accepted in a similar form in
Maryland.

- Robert L. Kline, III
Crawley v. General Motors:
DISPENSING WITH DISABILITY
IN OCCUPATIONAL DEAFNESS
CLAIMS
In Crawley v. General Motors, 70 Md.
App. 100,519 A.2d 1348 (1987) the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland interpreted Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 25A
(1985) to mean that a claimant's eligibility
to receive benefits under workers' compensation for occupational deafness is to
be determined without regard to the employee's loss of wages or his ability to perform his regular type of work. Prior to this
interpretation of § 25A, an employee who
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suffered from a hearing impairment as a
result of industrial noise had to demonstrate a loss of wages or an incapacity to
perform his regular work before being eligible for workers' compensation. By dispensing with this disability requirement,
the court of special appeals has increased
the number of claimants who are entitled
to benefits for occupational deafness. Now,
a claimant has to suffer only a compensable
amount of hearing loss before being eligible
for workers' compensation.
For over twenty years, Douglas Crawley,
Sr. had been exposed to industrial noise in
the assembly division of General Motors
where he worked. Alleging that he sustained a hearing loss as a result of his continued exposure to the industrial noise at
General Motors, Crawley filed a claim
with the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Commission determined that
Crawley had sustained a compensable degree of hearing loss resulting from his employment and awarded him benefits.
General Motors appealed to the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, arguing that a
"disablement" was necessary before an employee could be compensated for occupational deafness. Crawley stipulated that he
had not suffered any "disablement." Relying on Belschner v. Anchor Post Prods.,
Inc., 227 Md. 89,175 A.2d419 (1961), the
circuit court judge reversed the commission's order of award.
The claimant in Belschner had been employed as a saw operator for twelve years
and as a result of this employment, suffered a compensable amount of hearing
loss. The claimant, however, was still performing his duties as a saw operator and
did not lose any wages. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Workers'
Compensation Commission's rejection of
the claim and held that worker's compensation for an employee's loss of hearing
was limited by the language of § 22(a):
Where an employee of an employer
subject to this article suffers from an
occupational disease, and is thereby disabled from performing his work in the
last occupation in which he was injuriously exposed to the hazards of such
disease, and the disease was due to the
nature of the occupation ... the employee ... shall be entitled to compensation ... .
Md. Ann. Code art. 101, § 22(a) (1985)
(emphasis added).
The court of appeals in Belschner also
analyzed the definitions of "occupational
disease" and "disablement" in reaching its
conclusion. Section 67(13) defines "occupational disease" as "the event of an employee's becoming actually incapacitated,

either temporarily, partially or totally, because of a disease contracted as the result
of and in the course of employment." Section 67(15) defines "disablement" as "the
event of an employee's becoming actually
incapacitated, either partly or totally."
Citing Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v.
Coody, 278 S.W. 856 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926), the court therein held that an employee is not actually incapacitated within
the intent of the law if the employee has
the capacity to continue his regular employment and receives his usual rate of
pay. Although Belschner held that disablement was a prerequisite for worker's compensation for occupational deafness, the
court therein stated, "If there is a need to
liberalize the law or to change what we
think it plainly means, that is a legislative,
not a judicial function." Belschner, 227
Md. at 95, 175 A.2d at 422.
In 1967, six years after the Belschner decision, the Maryland General Assembly
enacted art. 101, § 25A entitled "Occupational deafness." The court of special
appeals in Crawley was confronted with
interpreting this section to resolve the dispute. Crawley contended that the legislature in enacting § 25A was responding to
the Belschner court's invitation to change
the law. General Motors, on the other
hand, contended that the legislature intended the disability requirement of§ 22(a)
to apply, viewing § 25A as merely establishing highly technical criteria for measuring occupational deafness.
The court of special appeals began its
inquiry of the legislative intent by examining § 25A itself. "Although the language of
section 25A does not specifically state
whether the General Assembly intended to
eliminate disablement as a precondition of
recovery for occupational deafness. Nevertheless, section 25A(a) reads 'Occupational
deafness shall be compensated according
to the terms and conditions of this section.'" Crawley, 70 Md. App. at 106, 519
A.2d at 1351 (emphasis in original). Concluding that the language of the section is
ambiguous and not clearly revealing the
legislative intent, the court examined the
legislative history of the section.
After examining the legislative history
of § 25A, the court concluded that the legislature not only intended to provide technical criteria for measuring loss of hearing
but also intended to make occupational
deafness compensable regardless of an employee's inability to work or loss of wages.
In reaching such a conclusion, the court
found the language of§ 25A(c) significant.
"By providing that a hearing loss of 15
decibels or less shall not constitute a compensable disability, the language employed
by the Legislature implies that a hearing

loss in excess of 15 decibels was intended
to be a compensable disability." Id. at
107, 519 A.2d at 1352 (emphasis in original).
Now, a "disability" for occupational
deafness claims is merely a loss of hearing
in excess of 15 decibels as calculated in accordance with § 25A. An employee no
longer has to suffer loss of wages or be unable to perform his regular type of work.
In dissenting, Judge Garrity stated that
the majority's interpretation of § 25A is
unreasonable and contrary to public policy.
"The very raison d'etre for providing workmen's compensation in the wake of contracting an occupational disease or disorder
is to restore to a worker that portion of
lost wages due to the physical disability
caused by that occupation." Id. at 109,519
A.2d at 1353. Judge Garity felt that the
intent of § 25A is to provide the much
needed technical criteria for measuring occupational deafness and to provide a qualifying standard of 15 decibels as calculated
in the section for determining compensability.
While it is difficult to determine the
ramifications of the majority's interpretation of § 25A, the decision permits employees who suffer a compensable amount
of hearing loss to be eligible for worker's
compensation while continuing to draw full
wages. This decision suggests that it is the
deafness and not the disability that is to be
compensated.
- Randolph C. Baker

Hughes v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Board: PAYMENT OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS UNDER CONCURRENT
EMPLOYMENT.
In 1979 a Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation referee awarded death benefits
based upon his conclusion that, for the
purposes of wage computation, a private
corporation and the federal government
were concurrent employers of the decedent
under the Pennsylvania Worker's Compensation Act (hereinafter "Act"). The
referee's decision was subsequently reversed by the Worker's Compensation
Board (hereinafter "Board") which ruled
that the federal government was not an
"employer" within the meaning of the Act.
In Hughes v. Workmen's CompensationAppeals Board, _ _ Pa. Commw. __,513
A.2d 576 (1986), the claimant, Rebecca
Lane Hughes, sought a judicial interpretation of the word "employer" as it is used in
the Act.

David George Hughes died on July 3,
1977, from injuries sustained in an automobile accident that occurred while he
was operating a vehicle for his employer,
Salem Transportation Co. He was survived
by his wife (hereinafter "claimant") and a
minor daughter.
Claimant was granted death benefits on
July 18, 1979 based on the referee's findings that, at the time of his death, Hughes
was not only employed by Salem, but was
also a member of the United States Navy
and on active duty. Thus, Hughes was an
employee of both the federal government
and a private corporation. The referee considered the earnings from both employers
in computiI1g wages for the purpose of determining the proper compensation due
Hughes' survivors. Id. at __, 513 A.2d
at 577.
The referee's decision was based upon
Section 309(e) of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, Act of June 2,
1915, P.L. 736 as amended, 77 P.S. § 582(e)
which establishes a requirement "[t]hat
when an injured employee is concurrently
working under contracts with two or more
employers, his wages from all of such employers shall be considered as if earned
from the employer liable for compensation
under the Act."
The Board reversed, determining that
the federal government was not an employer of Hughes and determined compensation solely on Hughes' earnings with
Salem. In reaching such a decision, the
Board relied on Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
and David H. Greenwood, 63 Pa. Cornmw.
Ct. 1,437 A.2d 494 (1981). However, this
case was of little significance to Hughes
since it dealt with a member of the Pennsylvania National Guard who was injured
while participating in an annual training
program. The claimant, Greenwood filed
a worker's compensation claim which was
denied by the referee and subsequently reversed by the Board, thereby granting
worker's compensation benefits. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, citing lack
of subject matter jurisdiction by the Worker's Compensation Board, vacated the
order.
The Board's reliance on Pennsylvania
Nat'l Guard ignored the issue at hand:
"[w]hether the federal government was the
decedent's employer for the purpose of
computing the amount of compensation to
be awarded to his survivors and paid by
Salem pursuant to section 309(e), 77 P.S.
§ 582(e)." Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard dealt
neither with amount of compensation nor
with concurrent employers. Id.
In addition, the employer (Salem) and
the Board contended that the word "em-

ployer" pursuant to Section 103, 77 P.S.
§ 21 did not include the federal government. Salem argued that the absence of
specifically naming the federal government
in the statute provided evidence of an intention to exclude the federal government
from enjoying employer status. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court interpreted
this silence to mean:
[t]hat the obligations imposed on employers and the rights conferred upon
workers by the Act are not to apply
to the federal government or its employees. But Section 309(e), 77 P.S.
§ 582(e), imposes no obligation whatsoever upon an employer other than
an employer for whom the injured employee was working, which in this case
was Salem, not the federal government.
Hence, while the federal government could
not be an employer for purposes of regulation or subjection to the Act, it was nevertheless a concurrent employer for purposes
of determining compensation due survivors,
paid by Salem (the liable employer). It was
the intention of the Pennsylvania Legislature to broaden the definition of employer
under the Act so as to "[ clover as many employment relationships in Pennsylvania as
possible." Giannuzzi v. Donninger Metal
Prods., 585 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (W.D.
Pa. 1984).
Finally, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court denied Salem's request for a "set off"
(reducing Salem's payments to claimant
by the amount of federal compensation
available to claimant). There existed no
evidence to show that the claimant was receiving federal compensation. Therefore,
a set off was not warranted.
The consequences of the Hughes decision are to maintain liability on the primary employer for whom the employee
was aCtually working when injured, while
preserving claimant's benefits and wages
from the secondary employer (the federal
government).
Section 309(e) poses a heavy burden on
the private employer since the private employer not only assumes sole liability but it
also provides no methods of decreasing
that liability.
-Pablo Emilio Lense
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